A. VALENTINE [????- ]
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VALENTINE, A. Capt. - O/C HKVDC POWs
Statement 24.8.1945:
“It must be borne in mind, while reading this report that the Japanese appointed Liaison Officer (Major C. Boon RASC) was entirely unreliable. He would have informed the Japanese Military Authorities if he had known of an organisation referred to below. Further, he had his own informers in Camp.
Any changes to the organisation (see para.26) therefore could not be put into effect, nor could steps be taken to change the lorry workers (see para.30) after it was known that the Japanese had their suspicions.
Kai Tak Working Parties commenced September 1942.
Soon after the commencement men from the HKVDC, owing to their knowledge of the Chinese language, were in daily conversation with Chinese overseers, some of whom were friendly.
During the months of October/November a number of messages written on small slips of paper were handed by members of the HKVDC to their OC [Capt. Valentine].
These messages were prepared in various forms on the following lines: a)”I am in touch with friends outside and I am anxious to make contact with the Senior British Officer in your Camp. Acknowledge receipt of message, giving your name. No.13.” b)”To the Senior British Officer. I have a message for you which will assist a party to escape. Please send reply. I am trying to make contact with Argyle Street Camp. Can you assist. No.17”. One message handed to Capt. Valentine was actually addressed to Major Boon.
On the second day Capt. Valentine took Lt. Prophet into his confidence. The possibility of a trap was foremost in our minds and after serious consideration we decided to bring in Capt. Ford, 2 RS.
Messages continued to reach us daily, some of which were stated as coming from Major Clague, RA, and after some deliberation we agreed to reply to a message handed in by Cpl Bond HKVDC. Cpl Bond appealed to us as the most reliable of the men who had handed us messages.
Cpl Bond and Sgt. Hardy, RAF comprised a party of 2 attending to the boiling of hot water for tea at the working party site. They volunteered to go out daily. Bond had a good knowledge of Cantonese and was in a position to cross-examine his Chinese contact (68) very thoroughly before handing over the first note.
F/Lt Gray was now brought into our confidence. No other officers or other ranks had any knowledge of the existence of this service with the outside world.
The first message sent out by us was purposely guarded and a covering statement added that we were not interested in organising an escape party. We also called for a reply to be properly signed by Major Clague whose signature we could identify in Camp. A confirmation of this was subsequently received.
Messages were then exchanged in earnest as having found that our Contact No.68 was genuine. We instructed No.68 to cancel all other sources in touch with the Camp-. No 68 replied that he was surprised that others were in touch. However, he was able to close down other sources.
Signed messages were received from Major Clague from Waichow offering facilities for escapes, placing Chungking agents at our service and giving us plans and routes.
Replies were sent to the effect that we were not in favour of escapes at this stage. The state of health of the Camp was at a very low ebb (Oct/Nov/Dec 1942) with many deaths resulting from dysentery, diphtheria and pellagra. A further dose of collective punishment would result in an increase in the death roll and lead to general distress to the Camp.
Further messages from Major Clague reminded us of the duties of all officers as regards escaping and to attach no sentimental value to those incapable of getting away (Note. It must be appreciated that we were officers placed in command of troops in a POW Camp and therefore had responsibilities to perform in attending to the welfare of the men. Major Clague ordered that all officers be informed, but these instructions were not complied with for reasons stated in the preamble of this report).
Arguments were then put forward based on Gen Maltby’s instructions on the subject of escapes and pointing out the great distress brought about by the last escape of RA officers March 1942. We appealed for medicines.
Towards the end of November, in reply to a request for a name it was decided to submit Capt Ford’s who was personally known to Major Clague. These messages were prepared and written out by Capt Ford and Lt Prophet in a bunk of one of the huts in HKVDC lines.
Details were then submitted over a period of days, giving particulars of drafts, deaths, numbers in hospital with major complaints, numbers in each unit and as much information as could be given concerning SS Po Camp, including scale of rations.
Mid-November, invisible ink came into use. This ink was prepared from rice or wheat flour and the writing could be developed by the use of a solution of Iodine.
Lt Cdr Boldero arrived at SS Po Camp on 9th November 1942. There was a strong feeling that he was to be sent to Argyle Street. We decided to take him into our confidence and to show him everything we had received. This proved an invaluable move as the transfer was made at his direct request to the Japanese authorities. On 17th December, Lt Cdr Boldero left and took with him messages hidden in his shaving soap.
Cdr Boldero, at Capt Valentine’s suggestion, appointed Capt Ford in command of Imperial troops and also advised a cross connection with the Canadian units, Capt Le Boutillier being chosen (Col Price being absent at Bowen Road Hospital).
A verbal message was sent by Cdr. Boldero to Gen Maltby to confirm Capt Ford’s appointment as the officer to take charge of the Imperial troops in the event of any eventuality. This appointment of Capt Ford and the policy decided on was approved by the GOC and communicated to Capt Ford by the remittance of a certain sum of money.
The close of the year (1942) sees the end of the Kai Tak Working Party.
Early in 1943 contact with No 68 was re-established. It was fortunate at this stage that the Chinese driver of the ration truck handed a message to T/139858 Dvr T. Farrell for delivery to Capt Ford. Farrell proved to be an excellent man for the job, permanently employed on the Ration Party and a regular service was soon re-established.
Col Price RRC arrived in SS Po Camp on 28th February 1943. All information was given to him and he took over control in an advisory capacity.
Messages to Argyle Street Camp were exchanged.
The routine then was: a) Messages after approval of other officers were compiled by Capt Ford and Lt prophet; b) Messages then handed to F/LT Gray for transmission to Sgt Hardy; c) Sgt Hardy to Dvr Farrell; d) Dvr Farrell to Chinese driver for transmission to No 68.
Some time during May, Dvr Farrell was discharged from the Ration Party which made it necessary to bring a new link into the chain. The matter was discussed with Col Price and it was suggested and agreed that Sgt Routledge RCCS also permanently employed on the Ration Party, should be brought in to take Farrell’s place. At the same time it was decided to change the office to Major Bishop’s (RCC) quarters in case the activities had been noticed in the old site.
During April/May 1943 messages were received from No 68 that he had been allotted other duties and that our correspondence would be handled through No 71 who apparently was mostly interested in medicines and sent in quite bulky parcels of drugs. He did not appear to exercise quite the same care as No 68.
No 71 was very anxious that Capt Ford should show himself in the Camp Garden which was overlooked by the road outside the Camp, so that No 71 could identify Capt Ford with pre-arranged signals. This was considered most unwise and quite unnecessary.
At this stage (April/May) the health of the Camp had greatly improved which was due to the Red Cross supplies which had come into Camp in November 1942, and the subject of escapes which was being constantly referred to was much more agreeable to us. Our considered opinion was that a large scale escape could be made with outside assistance and when this matter was being gone into by both sides the communication system failed. A further matter of importance which had been passed through was a report from Col Price to the Canadian Government representative in Chungking.
The last message received was in May 1943 and this was from No 68 informing us that No 71 had been detained for questioning by the Gendarmerie and to suspend delivery of messages for the time being.
On 1st July the Japanese interpreter Tsutada came into Camp and took out F/Lt Gray in his car. Tsutada had previously taken F/Lt Gray out to purchase sports equipment and it was first thought that his was a similar mission. However, concurrently with Tsutada’s visit, Tokunaga’s Adjutant arrived in Camp with ration truck and the driver identified Sgt Routledge who was taken into custody. A short time later Sgt Hardy was taken. Their kits and quarters were searched but we believe no incriminating evidence found.
On 10th July 1943, Capt Ford was taken into custody. Kit and quarters searched but all evidence by that time had been destroyed.
F/Lt Gray and Capt Ford were quartered with us in one of the old Coy offices, Nanking Area.”
Signed: A. Valentine, Capt HKVDC
Note by Lt Cdr J.C. Boldero: “On arrival at Argyle Street Camp, I informed the Commodore of this matter and was taken to see the GOC and Col Newnham. After this I attended one or two Conferences of Senior Officers to discuss the subject and after that was kept informed of the progress in Argyle Street by Col Newnham.”
Note by Lt Col Price: “I have carefully considered the above report and can fully corroborate from personal knowledge all statements referring to events which took place subsequent to my arrival at Shum Shui Po Camp on 28th February 1943.”
